Monday, May 2, 2011

Fwd: America's Will to War: The Turning Point



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From: ShunkW <shunkw@sbcglobal.net>
Date: Sun, May 1, 2011 at 10:42 PM
Subject: America's Will to War: The Turning Point
To: ShunkW <shunkw@sbcglobal.net>


America's Will to War: The Turning Point
by Ralph Raico <mailto:rraico@mac.com>
Recently by Ralph Raico: Neither the Wars Nor the Leaders Were Great
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/raico/raico41.1.html>
This article is excerpted from "American Foreign Policy - The Turning Point,
1898-1919," The Future of Freedom Foundation, 1995
With the end of the 20th century rapidly approaching, this is a time to look
back and gain some perspective on where we stand as a nation. Were the
Founding Fathers somehow to return, they would find it impossible to
recognize our political system. The major cause of this transformation has
been America's involvement in war and preparation for war over the past
hundred years. War has warped our constitutional order, the course of our
national development, and the very mentality of our people.
The process of distortion started about a century ago, when certain fateful
steps were taken that in time altered fundamentally the character of our
republic. One idea of America was abandoned and another took its place -
although no conscious, deliberate decision was ever made. Eventually, this
change affected all areas of American life, so that today our nation is
radically different from the original ideal and, indeed, from the ideal
probably still cherished by most Americans.
The turning point was signaled by a series of military adventures: the war
with Spain, the war for the conquest of the Philippines, and, finally, our
entry into the First World War. Together, they represented a profound break
with American traditions of government.
Until the end of the 19th century, American foreign policy essentially
followed the guidelines laid down by George Washington in his farewell
address to the American people:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is - in
extending our commercial relations - to have with them as little political
connection as possible.
The purpose of Washington's admonition against entanglements with foreign
powers was to minimize the chance of war. James Madison, the father of the
Constitution, expressed this understanding when he wrote:
Of all enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded,
because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent
of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and
taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination
of the few.
History taught that republics that engaged in frequent wars eventually lost
their character as free states. Hence, war was to be undertaken only in
defense of our nation against attack. The system of government that the
founders were bequeathing to us - with its division of powers, checks and
balances, and power concentrated in the states rather than the federal
government - depended on peace as the normal condition of our society.

This was the position not only of Washington and Madison but of John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and the other men who presided over the birth of the
United States. For over a century, it was adhered to and elaborated by our
leading statesmen. It could be called neutrality, or nonintervention, or
America first, or, as its modern enemies dubbed it, isolationism. The great
revisionist historian Charles A. Beard called it Continental Americanism.
This is how Beard defined it in A Foreign Policy for America, published in
1940:
[It is] a concentration of interest on the continental domain and on
building here a civilization in many respects peculiar to American life and
the potentials of the American heritage. In concrete terms, the words mean
non-intervention in the controversies and wars of Europe and Asia and
resistance to the intrusion of European or Asiatic powers, systems, and
imperial ambitions into the western hemisphere [as threatening to our
security].
An important implication of this principle was that, while we honored the
struggle for freedom of other peoples, we would not become a knight-errant,
spreading our ideals throughout the world by force of arms. John Quincy
Adams, secretary of state to James Monroe and later himself president of the
United States, declared in 1821,
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be
unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers.
But she does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the
well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and
vindicator only of her own.
John Quincy Adams was the real architect of what became known as the Monroe
Doctrine. In order to assure our security, we advised European powers to
refrain from interfering in the Western Hemisphere. In return, however, we
promised not to interfere in the affairs of Europe. The implied contract was
broken and the Monroe Doctrine annulled in the early 20th century by
Theodore Roosevelt and, above all, Woodrow Wilson.
This noninterventionist America, devoted to solving its own problems and
developing its own civilization, became the wonder of the world. The eyes
and hopes of freedom-loving peoples were turned to the Great Republic of the
West.
But sometimes the leaders of peoples fighting for their independence
misunderstood the American point of view. This was the case with the
Hungarians, who had fought a losing battle against the Habsburg monarchy and
its Russian allies. Their cause was championed by many sectors of American
public opinion. When the Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth came to America, he
was wildly cheered. He was presented to the president and Congress and
hailed by the secretary of state, Daniel Webster. But they all refused to
help in any concrete way. No public money, no arms, aid, or troops were
forthcoming for the Hungarian cause. Kossuth grew bitter and disillusioned.
He sought the help of Henry Clay, by then the grand old man of American
politics. Clay explained to Kossuth why the American leaders had acted as
they did: by giving official support to the Hungarian cause, we would have
abandoned "our ancient policy of amity and non-intervention." Clay
explained,
By the policy to which we have adhered since the days of Washington ... we
have done more for the cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect;
we have shown to other nations the way to greatness and happiness. ... Far
better is it for ourselves, for Hungary, and the cause of liberty, that,
adhering to our pacific system and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we
should keep our lamp burning brightly on this western shore, as a light to
all nations, than to hazard its utter extinction amid the ruins of fallen
and falling republics in Europe.

Similarly, in 1863, when Russia crushed a Polish revolt with great
brutality, the French emperor invited us to join in a protest to the Tsar.
Lincoln's secretary of state, William Seward, replied, defending "our policy
of non-intervention - straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to
other nations,"
The American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress
by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government,
forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances,
intervention, and interference.
This policy by no means entailed the "isolation" of the United States.
Throughout these decades, trade and cultural exchange flourished, as
American civilization progressed and we became an economic powerhouse. The
only thing that was prohibited was the kind of intervention in foreign
affairs that was likely to embroil us in war.
Towards the end of the 19th century, however, a different philosophy began
to emerge. In Europe, the free-trade and noninterventionist ideas of the
classical liberals were fading; more and more, the European states went in
for imperialism. The establishment of colonies and coaling stations around
the globe - and the creation of vast armies and navies to occupy and
garrison them - became the order of the day.
In the United States, this imperialism found an echo in the political class.
In 1890, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, of the Naval War College, published
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Soon translated into many foreign
languages, it was used by imperialists in Britain, Germany, Japan, and
elsewhere to intensify the naval arms race and the scramble for colonies. In
America, a young politician named Theodore Roosevelt made it his bible.
The great Democratic president Grover Cleveland - strict constitutionalist
and champion of the gold standard, free trade, and laissez-faire - held out
against the rising tide. But ideas of a "manifest destiny" for America
transcending the continent and stretching out to the whole world were taking
over the Republican Party. Roosevelt, Mahan, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, John
Hay, and others formed a cabal imbued with the new, proudly imperialist
vision. They called their program "the large policy."
To them, America up until then had been too small. As Roosevelt declared,
"The trouble with our nation is that we incline to fall into mere animal
sloth and ease." Americans lacked the will to plunge into the bracing
current of world politics, to court great dangers, and to do great deeds.
Instead, they were mired in their own petty and parochial affairs - their
families, their work, their communities, their churches, and their schools.
In spite of themselves, the American people would have to be dragged to
greatness by their leaders.
Often, the imperialists put their case in terms of the allegedly urgent need
to find foreign markets and capital outlets for American business. But this
was a propaganda ploy, and American business itself was largely skeptical of
this appeal. Charles Beard, no great friend of capitalists, wrote, "Loyalty
to the facts of the historical record must ascribe the idea of imperial
expansion mainly to naval officers and politicians rather than to
businessmen." For instance, as the imperialist frenzy spread and began to
converge on hostility to Spain and Spanish policy in Cuba, a Boston
stockbroker voiced the views of many of his class when he complained to
Senator Lodge that what businessmen really wanted was "peace and quiet." He
added, with amazing prescience, "If we attempt to regulate the affairs of
the whole world we will be in hot water from now until the end of time."
Reprinted from Mises.org.
April 28, 2011
Ralph Raico [send him mail <mailto:rraico@mac.com> ] is Professor Emeritus
in European history at Buffalo State College is a senior fellow
<http://mises.org/fellow.aspx?Id=13>  of the Mises Institute. He is a
specialist on the history of liberty, the liberal tradition in Europe, and
the relationship between war and the rise of the state. He is the author of
The Place of Religion in the Liberal Philosophy of Constant, Tocqueville,
and Lord Acton
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1610160002?ie=UTF8&tag=lewrockwell&linkCod
e=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=1610160002
> . His latest book is Great Wars and
Great Leaders: A Libertarian Rebuttal
<http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1610160967?ie=UTF8&tag=lewrockwell&linkCod
e=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=1610160967
> . You can study the history of
civilization under his guidance here: MP3-CD
<http://mises.org/store/History-The-Struggle-for-Liberty-A-Seminar-with-Ralp
h-Raico-MP3-CD-P184.aspx
>  and Audio Tape
<http://mises.org/store/History-The-Struggle-for-Liberty-A-Seminar-with-Ralp
h-Raico-cassettes-P178.aspx
> .
http://www.lewrockwell.com/raico/raico42.1.html

Sw

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